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A  Political  Economic  Analysis  of the
1982  Reclamation  Act
E.  Phillip LeVeen
The  passage  of  the  Reclamation  Re-
form Act of  1982 concluded a decade-long
fight  over  the administration  of  the orig-
inal Reclamation  Act of  1902. This paper
first discusses the economic significance  of
the  new  acreage  limitations  and  pricing
provisions  of the 1982  legislation and then
examines  some  of  the  political  economic
forces that influenced  the legislation.
Changes  in Reclamation  Law
The  Reclamation  Reform  Act  of  1982
fundamentally  changes  several  key  pro-
visions  of the  1902  Reclamation  Act,  es-
pecially  the  acreage  and  residency  re-
quirements  that  limit  access  to  federal
irrigation  water,  and  to  irrigation  water
pricing.  The  new  law  increases  the own-
ership  limit  on  land  eligible  for  Recla-
mation  water  from  320 to  960  acres  per
family  (husband,  wife  and  dependent
children)  or  for  a  corporation  with  less
than  25  shareholders.  Corporations  with
more  than  25  shareholders  are  restricted
to 640  acres.
The new  legislation eliminates  the resi-
dency requirement  and  in  its  place  insti-
tutes a limit of  960 acres as the maximum
size farm (irrespective  of whether the land
is  owned  or  leased  by  its  operator)  that
can receive subsidized water. Larger units
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must  pay the "full-cost"  of water used  on
land in  excess  of 960 acres.
A less obvious, but important part of the
1982  legislation  grants  irrigation  districts
already holding long-term  water contracts
until  1987  to amend  their contracts to  be
included under the new legislation. A sim-
ilar  option  is  available  to  any  individual
landowner,  whether  or not  his water  dis-
trict amends its contract. Significantly,  ac-
cording to the regulations proposed in May
(Federal  Register, May  3,  1983),  amend-
ed contracts must also conform to the 1982
pricing  regulations,  including  a  require-
ment that operation and maintenance costs
be  adjusted  annually  to  insure  their  full
repayment,  along  with repayment  of the
farmer's share of capital costs.
Water districts may elect not to amend
their  contracts  and  remain  under  the
"prior"  1902 Reclamation  law, paying the
old fixed contract prices for the remainder
of  their  existing  40-year  contracts;  only
when  these  expire  will  the  new  pricing
reforms  be introduced.  It  is  important  to
note,  however,  that  the  1982  legislation
does not  permit  a  return  to  all  of the old
administrative  practices  of  the  1902  law.
Beginning  in  1987, it requires  that a  full-
cost price  be  charged  to  any farm  opera-
tion  with  more  than  160  water-eligible
acres  (320  acres  per  family).  Thus,  if  a
family owns 320 acres and leases 320 acres
from  another  family,  the  full  water  cost
must  be  paid  on  the  leased  land,  unless
the  farm  operator  chooses  to amend  his
contract  with  the government.  He  would
then  be  eligible  to  receive  a  full  subsidy
on  the leased land  up to 960 acres.
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The Economic  Significance  of the
1982  Legislation
The  relaxation  of  the  acreage  limits  is
generally regarded  as a  victory for  West-
ern  landowning  interests  who  now  have
increased  access  to  substantial  federal
water  subsidies.  But  this victory  may  be
more  apparent  than  real,  especially  for
those  landowners  who  have,  in  the  past,
benefitted  most from  these  subsidies.  As-
suming that the law is enforced according
to  the  proposed  regulations,  the  subsidy
available  to many  landowners  is likely  to
completely  disappear.  This  is  especially
true  in  such  regions  as  California  where
farm  operations  now  far  exceed  the  960
acre  subsidy  limit.
Higher Reclamation  Water
Prices and the Water Subsidy
The  new  legislation  will  raise  water
prices  and  reduce,  by  varying  amounts,
the available water subsidy. To more fully
demonstrate this, I will begin by outlining
the nature of the subsidy, according  to the
program's  four  components.  First,  irriga-
tors are not  required  to repay  interest  on
capital  allocated  to  constructing  their
projects.  Over a typical contract period  of
50  years, the  interest  subsidy  is large  and
is  the  most  important  component  of  the
overall water subsidy.  Second, repayment
of  irrigation  costs  is  based  on  "ability  to
pay."  If  it  is  determined  that  irrigators
cannot  repay  the entire  non-interest  por-
tion  of capital  allocated  to their  project,
the  remainder  of  these  costs  may  be  re-
paid  from  profits  earned  by  the  sale  of
hydroelectricity.  Third,  because  of  the
combination  of  fixed  40-year  contract
prices  and  inflation,  actual  water  repay-
ments are not sufficient  to cover  both the
debt obligation  and the annual operations
and  maintenance  costs; thus  only  part  of
actual O  & M costs are repaid.  This aspect
of  the  subsidy  is  unintended  and  has  no
justification  in  any  legislation.  Fourth,  a
considerable  subsidy  is  available  to  proj-
ects  that  require  large  amounts  of  elec-
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tricity  for irrigation  pumping.  This  elec-
tricity,  generated  by Reclamation  project
dams,  is  "sold"  at a  fraction  of true mar-
ket  cost.  Again,  it  is  not  clear  that  this
subsidy  was intended  in any Reclamation
legislation.
It  should  be  added  that  these  subsi-
dies are further compounded in some dis-
tricts by the practice  of average cost pric-
ing. Under this practice very high costs of
new  unit  costs  within  a  large  project  are
averaged with much lower older unit costs
in order to keep repayment obligations of
new  districts  far  below  what  would  oth-
erwise  be required.  Because  of  the  fixed
water prices of the old districts, the higher
average costs that they should be charged
are postponed  until  long  into  the future.
Landowners in old, low-cost units have had
little incentive to discourage the inclusion
of  new  units,  even  when  they  do  not  di-
rectly  benefit from  additional water  sup-
plies.
The magnitude of the water subsidy also
varies  greatly  between  projects;  it  is  es-
pecially  large  on  the  newer,  higher  cost
developments.  On  average,  most districts
repay  less  than  10  to  at  most  30  percent
of  full  capital  (plus  interest)  and  O  & M
costs; see Table 2 of Charles Moore's com-
panion article in this volume. Moore's sub-
sidy  estimates  do  not  include  either  the
cheap power or the "average cost pricing"
subsidies,  which  may  be  substantial  in
some  districts.  For  example,  the  West-
lands  district  annually  requires  800  mil-
lion  kwhs  of  pumping  energy,  provided
by the  Bureau  of Reclamation  at a  price
of $0.25/kwh;  a  comparable  commercial
rate would  be closer  to  $0.04/kwh and  if
this  rate  were  charged  the  O  &  M  cost
would rise  $30/af. In this case, the power
subsidy  is  worth  almost  as  much  as  the
interest  subsidy.
Operation and Maintenance Prices
Amended  contracts  will  incorporate
provisions  allowing full repayment  of  op-
eration  and  maintenance  costs.  There  is,
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as  yet,  no data  showing  how  much  rates
will increase  because  of  this price  adjust-
ment.  However,  most  districts  have  con-
tracts that are over ten years old, with rates
set  before  the  onset  of rapid  inflation.  It
is likely, therefore,  that most districts  are
paying less  than one  half to one third the
total true  0  & M  costs.  The  importance
of  0  & M  costs  in  the overall  repayment
structure  is  subject  to  considerable  indi-
vidual variation, depending  on the nature
of the individual project and the age of its
contract.  In  some  districts,  total  revenue
now collected on the basis of the fixed-fee
schedules  is  insufficient  to  cover  0  & M,
let alone the capital repayment obligation.
In  these  districts,  water  prices  could  rise
substantially under amended contracts and
result  in  the  elimination  of  the  0  &  M
subsidy.
While  it  is  unlikely  that  the  "average
cost"  pricing policy  will be eliminated in
amended  contracts,  these  contracts  will
contain  a  clause  that  allows  rates  to  be
adjusted upward when costs rise in the fu-
ture.  Such  clauses  will  permit the  higher
average  costs of new  units to be  reflected
in the prices of  all project  beneficiaries  as
they  accrue and  not,  as now,  after a  long
postponement.  Average  water  prices  will
thus  rise  throughout  the  project  in  re-
sponse to new development.  This fact may
well  produce  resistance  to  new  develop-
ment from established water beneficiaries,
whose  costs  will  rise  even  if  they  do not
benefit from additional  water deliveries.
Farm Size, the Subsidy and
Full-Cost Water
Water  rates  will  also  rise  because  the
new law  specifies  the size of the farm op-
erating unit and not,  as under the old law,
the amount of land owned, as the basis for
determining  access  to  the water  subsidy.
When  ownership  was the basis  for deter-
mining  the  subsidy,  the  farm  operating
unit could be almost any size and  still re-
ceive subsidized water.  While the new law
does  not limit leasing, it does require that
the  full-cost  be  paid  for  any  water  re-
ceived  for an  operating  unit  in  excess  of
960 acres or over 320 acres,  if the contract
is not amended.  "Full-cost"  means a water
price  that  covers  all  unpaid  capital  costs
and  interest  thereon,  plus  full  operation
and maintenance  costs.  Estimates of these
costs are found in  Moore's  companion  ar-
ticle,  Table 2.
The potential impact of eliminating the
water  subsidy  for operations  will  depend
on  whether  districts  amend  their  con-
tracts.  Most  of the land  served  by  Recla-
mation  projects  is  farmed  in  operations
exceeding  320  acres,  and  more  than  30
percent  is farmed  in operations exceeding
960 acres; see Table  1. The  importance of
leasing  is  also evident.  Of  the 8.5  million
acres  surveyed  by  the  Bureau  of  Recla-
mation, over  3.1  million  acres,  or 37  per-
cent,  are  now operated  under  lease.  Most
of this leased land is now in units over 320
acres;  over  1.3  million  acres  is  on  units
with more than 960 acres.  Under the new
rules, if no district amends its contract, up
to  50  percent  of  all  reclamation  acreage
would be subject  to full-cost  pricing; if all
districts  amend,  about  16  percent  will  be
so  subject,  assuming  no  changes  in  aver-
age  farm  size.  It  is  clear  from  this  that
many landowners  in  virtually all  districts
will  have  strong  reason  to  amend  their
contracts  to  comply  with  the  new  law,
rather than to pay  the full water  costs on
land  in  excess  of  320  acres.  That  is  why
section 203(b) of the new law-which re-
quires  full-cost  water  charges  on  land  in
excess  of  320  acres,  if  contracts  are  not
amended by 1987-is called the "hammer
clause."  It forces  compliance with the new
law  and  leaves  very  little  alternative  for
most districts,  other than  to  amend  their
contracts.
This "hammer  clause" will not threaten
districts in which average farm size is now
less  than  960  acres  (except  insofar  as  it
forces upward revisions in O & M charges),
but it  does threaten  the status quo in  dis-
tricts with farms averaging  more than 960
acres.  While  such  large  farms  are  found
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TABLE  I. Size  of  Farm  Operations in All Districts.
% of All
Size  No.  of  OpraMean  Acres  Totalf  All
Operation  Operations  tions  Leased  Operated  Leased  Operated  Acres
1-160  35,498  74.5  11.4  54.9  405,158  1,948,320  23.1
161-320  5,810  12.2  73.0  231.3  424,423  1,343,859  15.9
321-640  4,494  9.4  184.2  448.1  827,905  2,013,683  23.8
641-960  607  1.3  306.1  803.1  185,753  487,420  5.8
961-1,280  399  0.8  473.0  1,085.8  188,847  433,463  5.1
1,281-1,920  396  0.8  515.9  1,529.9  204,115  605,275  7.2
1,921+  435  0.9  2,084.6  3,720.8  906,828  1,618,630  19.2
Total  47,638  100.0  66.0  177.4  3,143,029  8,450,651  100.0
Source:  U.S.  Department of the Interior,  Interim Report,  Op.  Cit.
in all districts,  they  predominate  in  a  rel-
atively few, mainly  in California  and  the
Southwest; see  Moore,  Table 3.  In  partic-
ular, note the San Luis Unit of the Central
Valley Project, which primarily serves the
500,000+  acres  of Westlands  Water  Dis-
trict.  Over  98  percent  of  its  irrigated
acreage  is  now  farmed  in  operations  ex-
ceeding  320  acres,  85  percent  in  opera-
tions  exceeding  960  acres,  and  fully  70
percent  of  the  land  is  farmed  in  opera-
tions  averaging  6,000  acres  each.  If  the
district  does  not  amend  its  contract,  all
but  a  very  small  portion  of  the  district
would  be  subject  to  full-cost  water  rates.
Even  if  it  does  amend,  over  80  percent
will still be subject to  these provisions,  as-
suming  no change  in  the size of farm  op-
erations.  These  considerations  imply  a
substantial increase  in average water costs
in  a  district like  the Westlands,  assuming
no  change  in farm  size.
Moore  provides  some  estimates  of the
full-costs  that  will  be  charged  on  water
delivered  to  farms  exceeding  the  320  or
960 acre limits; see his Table 2.  Since only
a  few districts  will be  forced  to pay these
rates,  assuming  that  most  amend  their
contracts, our concern is the magnitude of
full costs  in the districts most likely to  ex-
perience  them.  Eight  of  the  fifteen  dis-
tricts listed  in  Table  3  of  Moore's  article
have  potential  excess  land  over  the  960
acre limit.  However,  only 4 of these  have
more than 30 percent of their total acreage
above  the limit, while 3 have less than 15
percent in this category. In the case of the
four  former  districts,  full-cost  prices  un-
der the  new  law  would  lead  to  price  in-
creases of as little as $1/af in the Truckee-
Carson project to $25/af in the Westlands
and $60/af in  Altus-Lugert.
What  do  such  price  increases  imply?
Are they affordable?  At the very least, such
water price increases  represent a relative-
ly large reduction in net income  per acre.
For  example,  in  all  four  of  the  districts
with  large  amounts  of  excess  land,  the
price  increases  represent  at  least  20  per-
cent of total gross crop value. Rarely  is net
farm  income  much greater than  25 to  30
percent  of  gross  sales,  so  such  price  in-
creases  would  absorb  most of  the net  in-
come  now  being produced.
Further evidence that full-costs will im-
pose  substantial  economic  losses  is  found
in  recent  testimony  prepared  by  the  Ar-
vin-Edison  irrigation  district  in  Califor-
nia.  Calculations  are presented  that  show
full-cost  prices  will  increase  overall  pro-
duction  costs by $129/acre,  an amount in
excess  of average annual lease rates,  which
are  currently  about  $100/acre  (Paulden,
1983).  Even  if the  land  could  be  leased
for  a  zero  cost,  the farm  manager  would
still  experience  a  significantly  lower  re-
turn on  his operation.
This  testimony  accords  with  other  ra-
payment capacity  analysis undertaken by
this author  which examines  the ability  to
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pay  rising  water  costs  in  districts  neigh-
boring the Westlands,  which have similar
crop  mix and  production  costs.  This work
concludes  that prices  over  $30/af  absorb
all  of  the  potential  profit  to the  grower,
leaving  no return  to  management,  given
the current return on land (LeVeen, 1982).
Prices  over  $60/af  absorb  the  entire  re-
turn  on  land  as  well,  and  at  this  point  it
would be more profitable to leave the land
idle.  These  figures  are  in  rough  accord
with  the  repayment  capacity  for  the
Westlands  reported by Moore;  see his Ta-
ble 2. The prices that would prevail in the
Westlands  under full-cost  rates,  including
repayment  of  the  district's  distribution
system,  will  be  in  the  neighborhood  of
$60/af.  (Moore's estimated full-cost for the
Westlands  of $40/af leaves out the repay-
ment  of  the  distribution  facilities.)  Thus,
it  seems  very  likely  that  owners  of  most
of the leased land in this district will suffer
large  losses in  income  and wealth  as a  re-
sult of the new legislation.1
Full-Cost Water and the Westlands:
A  Case Study
As  we have  seen,  the  Westlands  Water
District is the most likely of all 18 districts
surveyed  to  be  forced  by  the  new  legis-
lation  to  pay  full  water  costs.  Charles
Moore believes that the landowners in this
district will pay the higher price of water.
My judgement  is that farming cannot take
The  general  conclusion  that  full-cost  pricing  will
prove extremely  burdensome  to farmers is also sup-
ported by other studies of irrigation subsidies  which
have found evidence of considerable  inefficiency  in
water project development.  For example,  the USDI
(1981)  survey  of  18  irrigation  districts  found  that
only  7  of  the  18  districts  experienced  land  value
increases  at  least  as  great  as.the  irrigation  invest-
ment;  most  of the  efficient  projects  were  the older
ones.  If the  investment  in  irrigation  does  not  pro-
duce  at  least  a comparable  increase  in land  value,
overall  economic benefits from the project are likely
to  be less than total costs.  Similarly  the GAO (1981)
concluded  that  none of six randomly  surveyed  dis-
tricts  could  repay full  costs.
place  under full-cost prices and  therefore
major  changes in  agrarian  structure seem
likely.
What  are  possible  options  for  mitigat-
ing  the  effects  of  high-cost  water  in  the
Westlands?  Some have suggested that ag-
riculture  will  be  intensified,  with  greater
production of "high value"  vegetable, fruit
and  nut  crops,  that  can  support  higher
water  prices.  Since  such  crops  comprise
only  a  small  fraction  of  the  Westlands
600,000  acres,  increasing  their  acreage
could improve repayment  capacity.  How-
ever,  markets  for  these  crops  are limited
and  are  not  growing  rapidly,  and  other
regions  of  the state  have  more favorable
conditions  for  their  production  than  the
Westlands.  Therefore,  while  some  inten-
sification  of  production  may  be  possible
over  the long-run, this strategy  is of little
value  in  meeting  higher  water  costs.  In-
deed,  the  alternative  strategy  of  shifting
to  lower  value  and  lower  water  using
crops, such  as wheat,  seems  a  more likely
possible  way to reduce  the loss  of income
from  higher  water  prices.  This  strategy,
however,  also implies  much lower net in-
come than under current  practices.
The  example  of wheat raises  the more
general possibility that water conservation
may allow sufficiently large savings to off-
set  full-cost  water rates.  The  logic  of  this
argument is certainly correct; higher water
costs will make more expensive water-sav-
ing technologies  profitable.  The  potential
savings, however, are at least partially  off-
set by higher costs of the technologies and
the energy required  to run them.  That is,
while water savings may lower water costs,
overall  irrigation  costs  probably  will  not
be lower with the adoption  of water  con-
servation  technologies.  Therefore,  repay-
ment  capacity  will  remain  very  limited.
Furthermore,  a region  like the Westlands
is already  relatively  "efficient"  in  its  use
of water;  for example, its distribution  sys-
tem  is entirely  covered  and underground
in  order to eliminate  evaporation.
The  fact that full-cost prices are above
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repayment capacity in the Westlands, and
elsewhere,  does not necessarily  imply that
individual  farmers  with  large  operations
will be forced to scale back production  to
960 acres or less.  An analogy can be drawn
to  the  farmer  who  expands  his  farm  by
purchasing very expensive land whose ad-
ditional output cannot justify its price.  By
blending the expensive new land with the
cheap land already owned, the farmer can
make  a  profit,  while  a  new  farmer  with
only  the expensive  land  could  not.  Simi-
larly, if  a  farmer  gets  inexpensive,  subsi-
dized  water  for  960 acres,  he  can  afford
to lease  some additional  land with expen-
sive full-cost water without driving his av-
erage  water  cost  above  the  no-profit
threshold.  For example, if the average  re-
payment capacity in the Westlands is $35/
af,  the  subsidized  rate  is  $25/af  (to  the
farmer)  and  the  full-cost  rate  is  $60/af,
then the operator  could lease another 392
acres and  have an average  water  cost less
than $35/af. This option, however, would
be of little value to the operators who cur-
rently  farm  70  percent  of the  district  in
units averaging  6,000 acres.
Large farm operators could simply stop
taking expensive project  water and  revert
to groundwater; but groundwater  is much
more  expensive  than  project  water;  and
would become even more so if withdrawal
rates  increased  and  the  water  table  fell.
Furthermore,  if the district does not raise
enough revenue  to  repay its  existing debt
obligations  to the Bureau  of Reclamation
through water  sales, it will levy land taxes
to raise the needed revenues.  Consequent-
ly, large farms will not be able to avoid at
least  some of  the  project  costs,  no matter
what strategy they  follow.
Absent  any  viable  strategy  for  paying
full water costs, it may be  presumed that,
under  the  imposition  of  the  new  legisla-
tion, the large farms in the Westlands  will
be broken  up into  much  smaller  produc-
tion units in order to remain economically
viable.  Landowners  will  have  powerful
incentives to lease to farm enterprises that
are less than 960 acres; otherwise  they will
be unable to earn any return.  Alternative-
ly, they  could  sell their land; but only in-
dividuals  eligible  for  the  subsidy  would
have any incentive to bid on the land, since
without  the  subsidy,  the  land  will  have
little value.
Because  of  the  farm  size  limit  on  the
subsidy,  markets for leasing  and  purchas-
ing land  will be  considerably  changed.  It
appears  likely  that  land  values  and  lease
rates may  fall  in response  to this change.
Here  I also disagree with Moore, when he
minimizes  the  possibility  of  a  significant
shift in  agrarian structure.  It seems  to me
that the  economics  of  full-cost  water  in-
sure  that  much  of  the  Westlands,  not  to
mention  significant  acreage  throughout
other Central  Valley Project districts,  will
be  forced  on  the  market  or  into  smaller
farm  units.
Some  Political-Economic
Speculations  on the 1982  Act
For most Reclamation  districts the 1982
legislation  will  have  modest  impacts,
mainly through  its impact on  O  & M  cost
adjustments.  However,  in certain  regions
of  California,  Washington,  Arizona  and
elsewhere  in  the  Southwest,  where  land-
ownership  is  concentrated,  leasing  is
widespread  and  large  operations  domi-
nate,  the new  legislation  will have impor-
tant  impacts  on water  prices,  agricultural
incomes  and  landownership.  Ironically,
while  the  legislation  is  usually  portrayed
as  a  victory  of  the  large  landowning  in-
terests in California and the Southwest,  the
analysis  presented above suggests that the
victory  is  a  modest  one.  The  only  true
"winners"  from  the  legislation  are  the
landowners  in Imperial  Valley  and in the
"Army Corps"  districts of the San Joaquin
Valley  who were  exempted  from  pricing
and  acreage  restrictions  altogether.  They
will be able to operate as before, with sub-
sidized water and no limits on the scale of
their  operations.
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Why  did the Westlands  Water District
fight  so  hard  for the  1982  legislation?  In
many ways, this district stands to lose more
than any other and will have to make  the
largest  adjustments  in  its  agrarian  struc-
ture.  To understand  the  Westland's  posi-
tion,  one  must  recognize  that  the  1982
legislation  is the  conclusion  of  a  decade-
long struggle to reform the administration
of  the  Reclamation  Act.  The  irrigation
districts  would  have  been  very  happy  to
leave the 1902 Reclamation  Act alone, but
they were  forced to  take action.
A  Political  Analysis of the New
Legislation: General Considerations
Rather than retell the events leading up
to  the 1982  Reclamation  Reform  Act, we
refer  the  reader  to  Moore's  summary  in
his companion  article in this volume. Here
we  develop the  thesis  that the  reform  of
Reclamation policy represents not so much
the  outcome  of  a  conflict  between  land
reformers and government bureaucrats,  as
it is frequently caste,  as it is  a continuing
struggle  within the government,  between
"special"  interests  and  the  Executive
Branch.  We  argue  that  because  our  im-
portant political institutions are structured
to  produce  such  irrational  policy,  it  has
become  increasingly  difficult  to  avoid fis-
cal crisis.  Reclamation  is but one  instance
of  a much  larger  pattern  of government.
In recent  years, the President  and  his ap-
pointees  in  the  Executive  Branch  have
been  forced  to  confront  the  irrationality
in  order to maintain  some degree  of  eco-
nomic  stability.  This  conflict  forced  the
reform  of Reclamation  policy.
As  Moore so  well  points out  in his arti-
cle, Reclamation  policy  is an excellent ex-
ample  of pork-barrel  politics, or PEST, in
the  new  economics  jargon.  Inefficient
public  investment  is  the  product  of  mu-
tually reinforcing  the triangle of relation-
ships  (familiarly,  the  "iron  triangle")  be-
tween  landowners,  bureaucrats  and
legislators.  Landowners  want  subsidized
water  to  increase  their  incomes  or  land
values. Since they pay only a small portion
of total  costs,  inefficient  projects  are still
very  profitable  from their perspective.
Administrators in  the Bureau  of  Recla-
mation want a growing  budget, and  have
found it most expedient  to work with those
in the private sector who have the greatest
political influence-namely,  the Western
landowners.  By designing and administer-
ing projects to suit these interests, the Bu-
reau confers on them large economic ben-
efits and thus creates a strong client group.
The landowners  express their  support for
the Bureau through their influence on key
Western Congress members who sit on the
relevant  oversight  committees  which  au-
thorize  and  appropriate  funds  to the  Bu-
reau. This influence takes the form of con-
tributions  and intense  lobbying.  Members
of  Congress  are  sensitive  to  landowners,
both because  they need  the financial sup-
port for reelection  and  because  they  can-
not  afford  to  alienate  these  interests  and
have them support  potential  political op-
ponents.  This  sensitivity  grows  with  the
rising  costs  of reelection  and  the  increas-
ing sophistication  in the use  of electronic
media.
The  iron  triangle  of  the  Reclamation
program was not very strong until the New
Deal.  Prior  to  that time  it  did  not  have
access to the federal treasury and depend-
ed on land  sales, mineral  leases, and  proj-
ect repayments for its revenue.  Roosevelt
used the Reclamation program to put peo-
ple to work; under his administration, ma-
jor projects,  including  the  Central  Valley
Project,  the  Boulder  Canyon  Project  and
the Grand  Coulee Dam were initiated.  In
order  for  this  expansion  to  take  place,
Reclamation was given direct access to the
treasury for revenue, and the subsidy was
further  increased  to  help  struggling
farmers  meet  repayment  obligations.  Al-
though the direct funding of Reclamation
was justified by the crisis in the economy,
the  program  continued  to  receive  funds
from the treasury with the return of more
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prosperous  times.  Similarly,  the  water
subsidy  has  not been  reduced  as  farmers'
"ability to pay" has risen (LeVeen,  1979).
The  New  Deal  emergency  programs
provided  the environment  for the growth
of special interest  politics. Once set in mo-
tion  the politics  developed  its own  logic.
During and after  World War  II, the Rec-
lamation  program  continued  to  expand,
even  though much of the additional  food
production  helped  to  worsen  the nation's
overall  "farm  problem"  and  contributed
to the costs of maintaining price supports.
As  discussed  above,  many  of the  proj-
ects built since the 1950s are economically
inefficient  (even  excluding  their  adverse
impact on other government  policies). This
raises  the  question  of  why  the  program
was  allowed  to  continue  expanding.  My
speculation is that until the mid-1970s,  the
costs of this economic irrationality  did not
imply large  political  costs.  The  relatively
rapid economic growth after the War pro-
vided  additional  revenues to  government
without  necessitating  large  tax  increases.
From  this  increased  revenue,  inefficient
Reclamation  projects  could  be  funded
without significant impact on budget def-
icits  and  without  forcing the  curtailment
of other government  projects.
The era of "stagflation"  and  rising gov-
ernment  deficits  implies  a  new  set  of  in-
fluences on the iron triangle that were not
present  in  the  1950s  and  60s.  Expendi-
tures for inefficient projects,  water or oth-
erwise,  no longer  have  harmless  political
consequences.  As demands  on the federal
budgets have grown faster  than revenues,
deficits  have  risen  along  with  inflation.
While  the logic  of  the  iron triangle  rela-
tionships  continues  to  demand  more  ex-
penditure, there  is  an increasing  counter-
balance in the Executive Branch that seeks
greater public control and better manage-
ment  as  a  means  of  insuring  the  broad
goals of  economic  growth,  price  stability,
and  employment.  The  center  of  this  op-
position  to the  iron  triangles  is  the Presi-
dency,  appointed  members  of  the  Exec-
utive Branch, such  as the Secretary  of the
Interior,  and  Executive  agencies  such  as
Office  of Management  and  Budget.
Unlike  individual  members  of  Con-
gress, the President is elected on how  well
the overall economy performs, not on how
well  a  particular  economic  interest  is
served.  He  sets  national  economic  policy
goals;  individuals  legislators  do not.  Dur-
ing  periods  of  economic  prosperity,  the
President has the flexibility to play special
interest  politics,  or at  least  not  to  oppose
the process.  During periods of crisis, how-
ever,  the President  may be  forced  to ad-
vocate  policies not favored  by some pow-
erful economic interests in order to achieve
broader  economic  goals.  This  appears  to
be the situation with the Reclamation  pro-
gram.
The President,  of course,  may not have
the  necessary  power  to  confront  directly
on  a powerful  political  and  economic  in-
terest.  But he does have  certain  weapons,
the most important  of which is the ability
to focus national attention on a  particular
program. Iron triangles need isolation from
public scrutiny to be successful;  if the gen-
eral  public  becomes  aroused  because  it
learns  of  corruption  or  mismanagement,
political  support  for  a  program  may  be
reduced,  since  members  of  Congress  will
be  reluctant to  vote for  programs clearly
perceived  by  their constituents  to  be  un-
desirable.
In  the  case  of  Reclamation,  the  "160-
acre"  provision  served  as  an  important
ideological  smokescreen  that  kept  the
public  from  understanding  that the main
beneficiaries  of  publicly  subsidized  irri-
gation  were  a  relatively  few  owners  of
large tracts  of irrigated  land. Instead, the
public  was led  to believe  that the subsidy
was widely distributed  and would be used
to promote  "family farming."2
2For  example,  Representative  Sisk,  speaking  for
Westlands landowners,  promised  on the floor  of the
House  that  the  Westlands  project  would  produce
6,000 new farms  (at most there are  100 new  farms
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The President  can exploit such a poten-
tial  weakness  by  calling  attention  to the
difference  between  rhetoric  and  reality.
In  the case  of Reclamation,  environmen-
talists and land reformers had been trying
for  many  years  to  focus  public  attention
on Reclamation,  so the President  had nat-
ural  allies.  The  Carter  Administration
found  these groups  useful  in  its  efforts to
reform  the nation's water  policy.
The Politics of Reclamation Reform
Reform  of the  nation's  water  develop-
ment policy was  an early goal of the Car-
ter Administration.  Changes  in  Reclama-
tion  fit  into  this  overall  strategy.  While
Carter  was unable to match the power  of
the  Reclamation  iron  triangle  as  evi-
denced by his failure to stop several  water
projects,  his  administration  did  not  give
up after  the first  losses.  Secretary  Andrus
took  much  of the  initiative  and  used  his
power  as  Secretary  of  the  Interior  in  an
unusual way.  While most of his predeces-
sors  were  sympathetic  with  the  Western
landowner interests, Andrus became  their
active opponent. He used the opportunity
afforded  by the  court-ordered  reform  of
Reclamation  to  spell out  a  set  of rules he
knew  would  be  unacceptable  to  Recla-
mation  interests.  Similarly,  he  exploited
the  uproar  over  Westlands  by  using  the
Congressionally mandated investigation  of
the administrative  abuses in this district to
place strong opponents of Reclamation  on
the special task force.  This panel selection
today,  fifteen  years  after  the  first  water  deliveries
were made  in 1968).  Such rhetoric helped generate
Congressional  support.  Imagine  the  problems  for
Sisk's speech  writers  had they  not had the  160-acre
provision  and,  instead,  were  forced  to report  that
most  of  the  project  benefits  would  go  to  a  few
wealthy individuals  and large  corporations,  such as
the Southern Pacific  Corporation,  which owns  more
than  100,000  acres  in the  District?  See  Represen-
tative  Sisk's statement  which  has  been  reproduced
in:  Joint  Hearing  before  the  Committee  on  Small
Business  and  Interior  Committee  and  Insular  Af-
fairs  (1976).
guaranteed  a full  hearing  of  all the issues
and  served  to  further  focus  public  and
Congressional  scrutiny  on  the glaring dis-
crepancies  between the rhetoric and  real-
ity. Finally,  Andrus  made  a special  effort
to undercut the ideological  position of the
Bureau  and  landowners  by  encouraging
new  research.  As  a result,  a  1978  USDA
publication  concluded  that smaller  farms
would be  viable and would  produce  food
as  cheaply  as  larger  farms  (ERS,  1978).
The  Environmental  Impact  Study,  re-
quired  by  the  court  injunction,  was  car-
ried out by an independent  consultant for
the Department  of the Interior.  It further
reinforced  the  1978  USDA  (USDI,  1981)
study  by extending  its result  to  more dis-
tricts, and supported land reformer claims
that  smaller  farms  would  improve  the
economic  vitality  of  the  related  rural
economies.  Landowners could cite no rep-
utable  literature  to  support  their  claims
that large farms were  in  the public  inter-
est.
Andrus,  thus,  put  the  Reclamation  in-
terests  on  the defensive.  It  is true that  his
proposed rules served to galvanize  the op-
position  and  to  stimulate  pressure  for
changing the law,  but even  if landowners
succeeded  in  modifying  the  law,  they
would  still be politically  weakened.
In  other  words,  Andrus  set  a  trap;  he
would  win  no matter  what  the outcome.
On the  one hand,  if  he  was  successful  in
forcing the rigorous administration  of the
old Reclamation  Act, he would reduce po-
litical  support  for  Reclamation,  since  a
strict  enforcement  of  the  proposed  rules
would  eliminate  much  of  the  economic
benefits for owners of large irrigated tracts.
If, on the other hand, the landowners pre-
vailed and reformed the law to their needs,
the elimination  of acreage  and  residency
requirements  would  strip  landowners  of
their  main  ideological  weapon  that  they
needed  to  justify their  programs  to  Con-
gress.  If there  were no limits on  the  sub-
sidy, landowners could no longer hide be-
hind the "small farmer" to legitimate their
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programs.  Consequently,  the Reclamation
program  would  be  weakened  politically.
Landowners  might therefore  preserve  the
benefits  they  had  already  won,  but  they
would  not  be  able  to  extend  them.  No
matter  what the outcome,  the iron  trian-
gle would  be weakened.
Secretary  James  Watt, Andrus'  succes-
sor, "stayed the course." While his proposed
Reclamation  reforms  (which were largely
adopted)  appear to accede to the interests
of landowners, they will nevertheless have
many  of  the  same  consequences  as  the
policies  pursued  by  the  Carter  Adminis-
tration.  As  we  have  seen,  by  trading  off
expanded acreage limits for full-cost pric-
ing,  Watt's  reforms  carry  potentially  as
much  sting for large  landowners  as  those
of  Andrus.  Furthermore,  lower  subsidies
will  drive  up the  political  costs  of  water
projects,  making  them  less  likely  candi-
dates for the  pork barrel. 3
The  attack on the Reclamation  subsidy
is part of a larger strategy of water pricing
reform  followed  by  both  the  Carter  and
Reagan  Administrations.  Another  aspect
of this strategy is making individual states
pay  a  portion  of  the  cost  of  new  project
development.  This is rationalized  in terms
of  granting  greater  local  control  to  the
states,  but  along  with control  goes  finan-
cial responsibility.  Most state governments
now  operate  under  stringent  fiscal  pres-
sures,  so  finding  the  revenue  for  a  water
project  will  require  taking  the  resources
from another spending  category.  The  ad-
vantage of having the federal government
pay  the  entire  cost  was  in  having  the  fi-
nancial  burden  distributed  over  all  tax-
payers  in  such small  amounts that no one
had much incentive  to oppose a particular
3 For  example,  in  California  new  water  cannot  be
developed  for  less  than  $100/af,  and  the  Auburn
Dam  project,  the construction  of which  was halted
under the Carter  Administration,  will produce water
costing  over  $200/af.  (See  Engelbert  and  Foley,
1982).  If  farmers  are required  to repay  as  little  as
15 percent of this cost,  they  will be unable to afford
the project.
project.  Once costs are concentrated,  there
will be stronger incentives for more groups
to  oppose water  projects.
Reclamation  Policy  and Future
Water Development
The struggle over Reclamation  policy  is
far  from  over.  The  new  reforms  are  sig-
nificant,  but they  have  not  yet been  im-
plemented.  Much  depends  on  how  the
Bureau administers the new  legislation.
The  Bureau  has  little  incentive  to  ad-
minister the new  legislation  in  ways  that
would  reduce  political  support  for  new
projects.  Bureaucrats want larger  budgets
and new  projects,  just  as  private  interests
want  more  business  and  greater  profits.
The  Bureau  found  many ways  to modify
the original Reclamation  Act to insure that
powerful constituents  could  live with  the
results.  It  is  not  surprising,  then,  to  find
the Bureau of Reclamation  now proposing
new legislation  to amend the 1982  Act by
eliminating  Section  203(b),  the  "hammer
clause."  Without this section, there will be
no reason for most districts to amend their
contracts,  since they can  continue  receiv-
ing  the  subsidy  under  the  old  preferred
administrative  practices  until  their  con-
tracts run out.
If Congress approves such a change, the
Western land  interests will indeed  win an
important  victory,  and  in  so  doing,  they
will undo the basic quid pro quo (i.e.,  less
restrictive  acreage  limits  in  return  for  a
lower  rate  of  subsidy)  embodied  in  the
1982 legislation.  However, the victory will
not  be  complete,  for  no matter  what the
outcome of this struggle, the full-cost pric-
ing  and  acreage  limits  will  apply  to  all
new  projects  and  contracts.  Therefore,
while  present  beneficiaries  may  be  suc-
cessful in protecting their existing subsidy
benefits,  such  benefits  will  still be  much
more limited for future beneficiaries. Thus
the political impetus for continued expan-
sion of the Reclamation  program will  still
be very  much  reduced.
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The Bureau may attempt to reduce the
adverse  effects  pricing  reforms  have  on
the political  viability of future projects  by
manipulating  other  provisions  of  Recla-
mation  policy  to extend  the subsidy.  The
new law  allows for an  "equivalency"  test
whereby  larger  amounts  of inferior  land
can  be  substituted  for  the  acreage  and
pricing  limits.  Equivalency  is  poorly  de-
fined and could become a loophole for ex-
tending the subsidy. Similarly, the new law
does  not  prevent  the  Bureau  from  using
"ability  to  pay"  criteria  in  the  determi-
nation of long-term  repayment  rates.  This
criteria is vague and easily manipuated to
lower  water  rates.  Finally,  the  share  of
project costs allocated  to recreation,  wild-
life  protection  and flood control, which is
paid  by  the  public,  can  be  increased  to
keep irrigation  costs below their true level.
The  1982  law  contains  no clear  defini-
tion of what constitutes  an individual farm
"operating  unit,"  which  is  the  basis  for
allocating  subsidies.  What  if a  5,000  acre
farm decides to call itself 5 separate farms,
but continues farming  as one  large farm?
The  Bureau may choose  to look the other
way,  as  it  has  with  the  manipulation  of
ownership  and  land  sales,  allowing  the
large, absentee owners continued access to
the subsidy.
The  landowners  will  also  attempt  to
subvert  the  new  legislation  through
lengthy court battles. One area of possible
litigation concerns the right of the Federal
government  to  change  a contract  after it
has been negotiated. Landowners contend
that the government has no right to change
their  fixed-fees  until  the  end  of  the  40-
year  contract  period.  Even  if  they  are
eventually  unsuccessful,  such  court  pro-
ceedings  could  substantially delay  imple-
menting  the  new  law  and  grant  many
more  years  of  subsidized  water  to  large
farm  operators.  Perhaps  this  is  the  ulti-
mate  strategy  of  the  Westlands  farmers.
The  costs  of  such  litigation  are  small  in
comparison  to  the  continued  benefits  of
cheap water.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that the rising com-
petition for increasingly  scarce water sup-
plies throughout the arid West has created
a new  imperative  to  use  available  water
supplies  more  efficiently.  Unfortunately,
the  important  water  development  insti-
tutions, designed in an era of surplus water
supplies,  are  not  well  suited  to  this new
task  and  generally  resist  the  necessary
changes.
The costs  of this inefficiency  are grow-
ing, but the political  logic of the iron tri-
angle that  has driven Reclamation  policy
since the New Deal has not shifted.  What
has changed in Federal water policy  is the
role  of  the  Executive  Branch.  Often  uti-
lizing  the  reform  efforts  of  land  reform-
ers,  environmentalists  and  fiscal  conser-
vatives,  the  Executive  has  attempted  to
break  the power  of the  pork barrel  in  an
effort  to reduce  fiscal strains that increas-
ingly  threaten  overall  political  and  eco-
nomic  stability.  The  outcome  of  this
growing struggle between  the "special  in-
terests"  and  the  Executive  is  far  from
clear.  In  this  sense,  the  reform  of Recla-
mation policy  is  but one  piece  of  a much
larger picture.
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